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1 Introduction
At the heart of Fear of Knowledge is a dilemma that Boghossian (2006) likens to a
Kantian antimony. Call it the antimony of reason:
• On the one hand, epistemic relativism is incoherent;
• On the other hand, epistemic absolutism is circular and so groundless.
The resolution of the antimony is a defense of rule circularity. Epistemic absolutism
might be circular but that does not make it groundless.
I will make two sets of remarks. In the rst set of remarks, I will address the
alleged incoherence of epistemic relativism. If, for all that Boghossian has said,
epistemic relativism is not, in fact, incoherent, then the antinomy of reason is never
generated. In the second set of remarks, I will address the ambitions and rhetorical
eectiveness of Fear of Knowledge.
2 Epistemic RelativismDened
Epistemic relativism is a claim about epistemic justication. Epistemic justication
is contrasted with pragmatic justication. The intuitive idea is that the epistemic
justication for a belief is constituted by evidence for the truth of that beliefit
is a consideration that counts in favor of that belief 's being true. In contrast, a
pragmatic justication for belief, of the kind that Pascal oers in his wager, is a
consideration that counts in favor of holding that belief, regardless of its truth.
Epistemic relativism is a relativism about epistemic as opposed to pragmatic justi
cation.
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Before we come to Boghossian's characterization of epistemic relativism, wemust
rst understand three auxiliary notions.
First, an epistemic judgment is a belief whose content is a particular normative
proposition connecting an item of information with a belief that it epistemically
justies. Boghossian oers the following example:
If it visually seems to Galileo that there are mountains on the moon,
thenGalileo is prima facie justied in believing that there are mountains
on the moon.
The justication here is epistemic justication since its visually seeming that there
are mountains on the moon is a consideration that counts in favor of their being
mountains on the moon.
Second, an epistemic principle is a general normative proposition connecting items
of information with the beliefs they epistemically justify. Boghossian oers the
following example:
Observation: For any observational proposition p, if it visually seems to
S that p, then S is prima facie justied in believing p.
Again, the justication here is epistemic justication since its visually seeming that
p is a consideration that counts in favor of believing that p is the case.
Third, an epistemic system is a set of epistemic principles. Epistemic systems can
be assessed according to various standards of coherence.
Now that we understand the notions of an epistemic judgment, an epistemic
principle and an epistemic system, we are in a position to understand Boghos
sian's characterization of epistemic relativism. Boghossian characterizes epistemic
relativism as the conjunction of three doctrines:
1. EpistemicNonabsolutism: There are no absolute facts about epistemic justication
facts about what belief a particular item of information epistemically justies.
2. Epistemic Relationalism: If a person, S's, epistemic judgments are to have any
prospect of being true, we must not construe his utterance of the form E
justies belief B as expressing the claim E justies belief B but rather as ex
pressing the claim According to the epistemic system C, that I, S, accept, information
E justies belief B.
3. Epistemic Pluralism: There are many fundamentally dierent, genuinely alter
native epistemic systems, but no facts by virtue of which one of these systems
is more correct than any of the others.
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What's the logical relationship between these three doctrines? Boghossian does
not explicitly say. Nevertheless, it is natural to understand epistemic relationalism
as the fundamental doctrine with the denial of absolutism and epistemic plural
ism as consequences of epistemic relationalism. So consider the case of motion.
Relationalism about motion is the claim that a body is in motion only relative
to a spatiotemporal framework. Relationalism about motion entails the denial of
absolutism about motionthere are no facts about motion independent of a spa
tiotemporal framework. Relationalism about motion also entails pluralism about
motion. A body can be at rest relative to one spatiotemporal framework and at
motion relative to a dierent spatiotemporal framework.
According to Boghossian's reconstruction, however, the denial of absolutism is
the fundamental doctrine in terms of which epistemic relationalism and pluralism
are to be understood. This is, admittedly, unobvious from the present formulation
of the three doctrines, but Boghossian's reasons for taking the denial of absolutism
as the fundamental doctrine will emerge when we discuss his arguments against
epistemic relationalism and pluralism.
This is related to the apparent rhetorical oddity of Boghossian's initial qualica
tion of epistemic relationalism:
If a person, S's, epistemic judgments are to have any prospect of being
true . . .
In the present context, it is natural to interpret this as saying:
If a person, S's, epistemic judgmentsas the epistemic relativist understands
themare to have any prospect of being true . . .
But so understood, the prospects that relative epistemic judgments have of being
true are few. But that seems, if not question begging, then at least unwarranted
prior to any antirelativist argument. I was careful to speak of the apparent rhetorical
oddity of this remark. It's true signicance is to signal that Boghossian has given us
a reconstruction of relationalism in terms of the denial of epistemic absolutism. As we
will see, this alternative interpretation is not without its own rhetorical diculties.
Another apparent oddity in the present formulation of epistemic relationalism is
its individualistic character. The discussion of epistemic relativism takes place in
the context of inquiring whether there is an interpretation of social constructivism
that constitutes a defensible form of antirealism. It is odd, then, that epistemic
judgments are relativized to epistemic systems that an individual accepts. Wouldn't
the more relevant formulation be in terms of epistemic systems that a community
agrees upon? This does not directly aect the antirelativist argument that Boghos
sian actually gives, but it does directly aect Boghossian's motive for giving that
argument.
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3 Against Epistemic Relationalism
Recall epistemic relationalism is the following doctrine:
If a person, S's, epistemic judgments are to have any prospect of being
true, we must not construe his utterance of the form E justies belief
B as expressing the claim E justies belief B but rather as expressing
the claim According to the epistemic system C, that I, S, accept, information E
justies belief B.
Boghossian believes epistemic relationalism to be not only untrue, but incoherent.
What is the source of this putative incoherence?
Consider now the relationship between the content of an epistemic judgment and
an epistemic principle that would license it. Recall that the content of an epistemic
judgment is a particular normative proposition, say, the proposition that:
If it visually seems to Galileo that there are mountains on the moon,
thenGalileo is prima facie justied in believing that there are mountains
on the moon.
Consider the epistemic principle, Observation, that licenses that judgment:
For any observational proposition p, it if visually seems to S that p, then
S is prima facie justied in believing p
The content of the epistemic judgment is an instance of the epistemic principle,
the latter being a universal generalization.
Given this logical relationship, Boghossian observes:
Now, however, if the relativist's central thought is that particular epis
temic judgments are uniformly false, and somust be replaced by judgments
about what is entailed by the epistemic systems that we happen to ac
cept, then it follows from this central thought that the general epistemic
principles which constitute the epistemic systems that we accept must
be false, too, for they are general propositions of much the same type.
(Boghossian, 2006, 856)
The problem now is plain:
The trouble is that, as we have already seen, it is crucial to the relativist's
view that thinker's accept one or another of these systems, that they en
dorse one or another of them and then talk about what they do or do not
permit. . . . But how could we go on accepting one or another of these
epistemic systems, once we have bought in on the relativist's central
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thought that there are no absolute facts about justication and so have
come to conclude that they are made up out of uniformly false proposi
tions? . . . [I]t makes no sense to insist that we abandon making absolute
particular judgments about what justies while allowing us to accept ab
solute general judgments about what justies what. (Boghossian, 2006,
86)
According to epistemic relativism, then, a subject S cannot accept an epistemic
judgment of the form:
If E is the case, then belief B is justied.
since such judgments are uniformly false. At best, S must accept, instead:
According to the epistemic system C, that I, S, accept, information E
justies belief B.
But information E justies belief B according to epistemic system C because C
contains an epistemic principle that has, as an instance, the particular normative
proposition expressed by the epistemic judgment. But if the relevant epistemic
principle has false instances, then it is itself false. But then S could no more accept
the epistemic system C than S could accept the false epistemic judgment, and so
epistemic relationalism is incoherent.
4 Against Epistemic Pluralism
Recall epistemic pluralism is the following doctrine:
There aremany fundamentally dierent, genuinely alternative epistemic
systems, but no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more
correct than any of the others.
Boghossian believes that a similar incoherence aects this doctrine. What is the
source of this putative incoherence?
Consider two epistemic systems, C1 and C2. According to C1:
If E is the case, then belief B is justied.
In contrast, according to C2:
It is not the case that if E is the case, then belief B is justied.
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However, according to Boghossian, it is hard to understand how both of these
epistemic systems could be correct. Either it is the case that E suces for B's
justication or it doesn't. If we accept the relativist's central denial, that there are
no facts about absolute justication, then E is not sucient for B's justication. But
now it seems that whereas C1 contains a falsehood, C2 has replaced this falsehood
with a truth. But isn't this just grounds for claiming that, at least in this regard, C2
is more correct than C1? And if it is, then epistemic pluralism is incoherent.
5 Epistemic Fictionalism
According to epistemic relationalism, as Boghossian understands it, epistemic judg
ments, insofar as they are true, do not express the claim that that judgment is true
but rather express the claim that the epistemic judgment is entailed by the epis
temic system accepted by the subject. This diers importantly from more familiar
relationalist claims about, say, the relational character of motion or of the perceived
location of a rainbow. Indeed, epistemic relationalism, as Boghossian understands
it, is not a form of relationalism at all but is, instead, an incoherent form of epistemic
ctionalism.
Motion is relative to a spatiotemporal framework. A body is at rest or in motion
only relative to a spatiotemporal framework. Similarly, the perceived location of a
rainbow is relative to the perspective of the perceiver. A rainbow has a perceived
location only relative to the point of view inhabited by the perceiver.
When I say that a body is in motion, or that the rainbow is located just over that
hill, have I spoken falsely? No. For, plausibly, relative to the conversationally salient
spatiotemporal framework, the body in question is in motion. So understood, I
have spoken truly. Similarly, relative to my point of view, the rainbow is located just
over that hill. Again, so understood, I have spoken truly.
Focus for the moment, on the case of motion. It seems wrong to attribute
systematic error to all motion talk prior to the discovery of relativity and wrong
to think that our clued in talk of motion involves a change of meaningwhich it
would have to, if we are now speaking truly whereas before we spoke falsely. The
right thing to say is that `moves' designates a relative property even if it is no part of
the meaning of `moves' that motion is relative to a spatiotemporal framework. That
motion is relative is a substantive metaphysical claim about the nature of motion
not settled by reection on the meaning of public language expressions.
So, the central thought about the relativity of motion is not that all particular
propositions about motion are false. The central thought about the relativity of
motion is a metaphysical claim about motionthat the motion of a body is only
relative to a spatiotemporal framework. But this metaphysical claim only entails
the distinct denial that all particular propositions about absolute motion are false.
6
Similarly, the central thought about the relativity of the perceived location of a
rainbow is a metaphysical claim about the perceived location of the rainbowthat
a rainbow is located only relative to a perceiver. But this metaphysical claim only
entails the distinct denial that all particular propositions about the perspective
independent location of the rainbow are false. Moreover, the central thought about
the relativity of epistemic justication is a metaphysical claim about epistemic
justicationthat an item of information only epistemically justies a belief relative
to an epistemic system. But this metaphysical claim only entails the distinct denial
that all particular propositions about absolute epistemic justication are false.
When Boghossian claims that `the relativist's central thought is that particu
lar epistemic judgments are uniformly false', he is understanding these epistemic
judgments as the absolutist understands themas expressing particular normative
propositions about absolutist justication. But this is not how the epistemic relativist
understands themas expressing particular normative propositions about relativist
justication. So construed, for all that has been said, such judgments may be true,
just as judgments about motion and the perceived location of the rainbow may be
true. No epistemic relativist worth his salt would maintain otherwise.
But if epistemic judgments can be true, as the epistemic relativist understands
them, thenBoghossian's case against epistemic relativismcollapses. The case against
epistemic relationalism depended on the thought that:
Epistemic judgments, and so the epistemic principles that license them,
are uniformly false.
But that is only plausible if epistemic judgments concern absolutist justication.
If, instead, they concern relativist justication, as the epistemic relativist contends,
then this thought is plausibly falseor at the very least, for all that has been said,
it may very well be true. The relativist does not claim that there are no facts
about epistemic justication, only that there are no absolute facts about epistemic
justication. Similarly, the case against epistemic pluralismdependedon the thought
that:
Either E is sucient for the justication of belief B, or it isn't
But that is only plausible if epistemic judgments concern absolutist justication.
If, instead, they concern relativist justication, as the epistemic relativist contends,
this thought is false. At best, the epistemic relativist would endorse the following
thought:
Relative to epistemic system C, either E is sucient for the justication
of belief B, or it isn't.
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E could not both justify and fail to justify belief B relative to the epistemic system
C1 that S1 accepts. But E could at once justify belief B relative to the epistemic
systemC1 that S1 accepts and fail to justify belief B relative to the epistemic system
C2 that S2 accepts.
We have been oered, not epistemic relationalism, but a surrogate for it. Epis
temic relationalism, despite its title, is not a form of relationalism at all. In familiar
and less controversial cases of relativism, relationalism is most naturally understood
as a metaphysical claim about the relational nature of the facts in questionthat
they consist in certain relations obtaining. Relationalism, as Boghossian under
stands this doctrine, is not a metaphysical claim but a metalinguistic claim. Nor is
this a harmless application of semantic assent. Relative epistemic judgments are
not claimed to express propositions with a relational subject matter, but rather
are claimed to express propositions about entailment relations between proposi
tions with an absolutists subject matter. As Boghossian understands this doctrine,
epistemic justication is not claimed to be relative to accepted epistemic systems;
rather, epistemic judgments are merely claimed to be entailed by accepted epistemic
systems (understood as sets of propositions). So understood, it is a form of epistemic
ctionalism, although one of dubious coherence.
So consider Field's mathematical ctionalism. Field denies that there are abstract
objectsobjects that do not participate in the causal closed spatiotemporal system
of eventsbut accepts, for example, that two plus two equals four. If numbers
are abstract objects, then in what does Field's acceptance consist? At one point,
Field (1989) made the following proposal: When we accept that two plus two
equals four we should believe only that according to standard mathematics, two
plus two equals fourthat two plus two equals four is a claim entailed by standard
mathematics. `Standard mathematics' is understood as the mathematics accepted
by mathematicians, deployed by engineers, and so on. But just as acceptance of
a particular mathematical proposition should not be understood as belief, neither
should acceptance of standard mathematics be understood as belief in its truth (as
opposed to belief in its deductive utility and a commitment to deploy it in drawing
inferences among propositions about concreta, say).
The parallel should be clear: When the relativist, as Boghossian portrays him,
accepts a particular normative proposition p, he believes only that according to
the epistemic system that he accepts, p. When the ctionalist accepts a particular
mathematical proposition p, he believes only that according to standard mathemat
ics, p. Not only is the parallel clear, but so is a crucial dierence. For whereas the
ctionalist denies that the acceptance of standardmathematics is belief, Boghossian
insists that the acceptance of an epistemic system is belief. That is why I claimed
that this is an incoherent form of epistemic ctionalism, for it outs the ctionalist's
central insight, if it is onethat acceptance in serious inquiry need not be belief.
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6 Agreement and Epistemic Relationalism
What's gone wrong? Boghossian has oered us, in his very denition of epistemic
relativism, not epistemic relationalism, but a ctionalist surrogate for it.
I believe that oering a surrogate for epistemic relationalism is not unmotivated.
Indeed, it is motivated by a puzzle about what epistemic judgments could be relative
to.
According to the relativist, epistemic judgments are relative to accepted epistemic
systems. But epistemic systems, in Boghossian's framework, are sets of general
normative propositions connecting items of informationwith the beliefs they justify.
But how could the truth of a particular normative proposition be relative to the
general normative proposition of which it is an instance? That thought is surely
incoherent. It couldn't. Since epistemic relationalism is an incoherent option in
Boghossian's framework, Boghossian fastens on the denial of absolutist epistemic
justication as the central relativist claim and reconstrues both relationalism and
pluralism in terms of this denial.
But perhaps the problem lies, not with making sense of epistemic relationalism,
but the framework in terms of which Boghossian attempts to make sense of it.
Earlier, I complained about the individualistic character of Boghossian's formu
lation of epistemic relationalism. Epistemic judgments are relativized to epistemic
systems that an individual accepts. In the context of a discussion of social construc
tivism, wouldn't themore relevant formulation be in terms of epistemic systems that
a community agrees upon? As I observed, this does not directly aect the antirelativist
argument that Boghossian gives, but it does directly aect Boghossian's motive for
giving that argument. For it provides the basis of an alternative to Boghossian's
framework, an alternative whose passing unnoticed leads Boghossian to oer his
reconstruction of epistemic relationalism as an incoherent form of epistemic c
tionalism.
Consider, then, plausible forms of social relativism. Indeed, consider one of
Boghossian's favorite examplesthe fashionable. If something is fashionable, then
what makes it so is that we agree that it is fashionable. Perhaps, not everyone's
judgment counts as much as anyone else's. Perhaps Alexander McQueen's judgment
countsmore thanmine, say. Nevertheless, whatmakes something fashionable is that
it is agreed to be fashionable, at least by the right people. Thus it seems incoherent
to suppose that there could be a community with widespread agreement about
what's fashionable that is nevertheless in systematic error about thisthat there
could be hidden facts about what's really fashionable that had passed unnoticed by
the entire community.
The truth about what's fashionable seem relative to agreement about what's fash
ionable. Perhaps, epistemic systems should be understood, not as sets of epistemic
principles, but as sets of epistemic principles that communities of inquiry agree
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upon. So understood, epistemic justication is not relative to the epistemic pinciples
agreed upon but to the agreement upon those principles. So the reason that if it vi
sually seems to Galileo that there are mountains on the moon, then Galileo is prima
facie justied in believing that there are mountains on the moon is that, in Galileo's
community of inquiry, Observation is an agreed upon epistemic principle. Just as the
oside rule is a standard of play whose validity depends on and derives from the
agreement reached by the eleven member clubs of the Football Association on De
cember 1, 1863, Observation is a standard of inquiry whose validity depends on and
derives from the agreement reached by the natural philosophers who constituted
Galileo's community of inquiry.
Formulating epistemic relationalism in terms of agreement is not an unfamiliar
idea. It is at least entertained if not endorsed byWittgenstein. Relativizing the truth
of particular normative proposition to agreement is not incoherent in the specic
way that relativizing its truth to the corresponding general normative proposition
is. Moreover, epistemic relationalism, so understood, and the entailed epistemic
pluralism, would not be subject to the arguments that Boghossian gives. It is not
without its problems. What account can it give of the conict between Galileo
and Cardinal Bellarmine? (Though Harman, 1996, in a work cited by Boghossian,
gives an expressivist account of this kind of conict, in the moral domain, which
he describes as quasiabsolutism, paralleling, as it does, Blackburn's quasirealism.
Moreover, relativist accounts of disagreement have been recently discussed by John
McFarlane, forthcoming.) Perhaps it is ultimately an untenable position. I believe it
is. But nothing Boghossian says establishes this, and the alleged antinomy of reason
never gets o the ground.
7 Persuasiveness and the Source of Relativistic
Conviction
Let me now consider, not the cogency of Boghossian's case, but its rhetorical eec
tiveness.
Boghossian takes the source of relativistic conviction to lie in the cogency of the
arguments that support it. If the source of relativistic conviction lies in the cogency
of the arguments advanced in its favor, then undermining these arguments would
undermine the source of relativistic conviction.
One problem is that Boghossian only considers the arguments of the radical left
of analytic metaphysics. Specically, he only considers the arguments of Goodman,
Putnam, and Rorty. (Foucault is only mentioned briey and dismissively.) Unfor
tunately, the relativistically inclined among our colleagues in the humanities and
all they have taught and inuenced are steeped in a dierent intellectual tradition
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with its own arguments that Boghossian fails to consider. Thus for example, there
is a semantic tradition stemming from Saussure that ultimately failed to provide,
as we might put it, a determinate denotational semantics. Instead of rejecting this
semantic framework, some authors embraced this indeterminacy and drew relativis
tic conclusions from it. This intellectual trajectory can be found in diverse writers
such as Lacan and Derrida and interestingly parallels Quine's own intellectual tra
jectory. Assessing these arguments would directly engage with that tradition and
would be an interesting intellectual exerciseone that Boghossian does not deign
to undertake.
There is a deeper problem, however, having to do with the very assumption that
the source of relativistic conviction lies with the arguments advanced in its favor.
Suppose, instead, that the arguments advanced in favor of relativism are not the
source of relativistic conviction but the expression of it. Arguments can be the
grounds upon which we believe their conclusions, but this is not the only role that
arguments play in our cognitive practice. Even if we antecedently and justiably
believe the conclusion of an argument, sometimes at least, it remains a theoretical
advance to be able to give a cogent argument for that belief (Frege claims this in
the preface to the Foundations of Arithmetic)in which case the argument is not the
source of conviction but the product of it. Or again, the cognitive utility of an
argument may lie in the conceptual connections it makes salient, a cognitive utility
it would retain even if its conclusion were antecedently and justiably believed.
Arguments may be used to register and articulate a conviction antecedently held in
which case the argument is less the source of conviction that the expression of it.
The arguments advanced in favor of nominalism and qualia can seem to function
in this latter wayat least to their opponents. Consider then some recent analytic
philosophy, if not how it was, then how it nearly might have been. Arguments are
advanced for nominalism and qualia and are replaced by new arguments when they
are shown to be decient by their critics. If this pattern persists it is at least rea
sonable to entertain the hypothesis that the source of nominalist and phenomenist
conviction is not the arguments advanced in their favorafter all conviction per
sists after they are exposed to be decient. One Wittgensteinian alternative would
be that the source of nominalist and phenomenist conviction lie not with the ar
guments advanced in their favor, but with a philosophical picture that animates the
construction of these arguments. In both cases, the picture is not hard to discern,
at least in rough outline, since each are motivated by thought experiments that
seem to be the means of conceiving independent variation in two domainsthe
abstract and the concrete, the qualitative and the material. In such an intellectual
climate, combatting nominalist or phenominist conviction requires, if not therapy,
then disenchantment with the pictures that guide the thoughts of some.
My rst observation, then, is that the source of relativistic conviction is relevant
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to the rhetorical eectiveness of undermining the arguments advanced in its favor. If
the source of relativistic conviction does not lie with the cogency of these arguments,
then undermining them would leave relativistic conviction untouched.
My second observation is that the thought that the source of relativistic con
viction consists in the arguments advanced in its favor is a substantive sociological
claim. It is, after all, a causal explanatory claim about beliefs widely held across
the populations of diverse communities. No sociological evidence is advanced in its
favor nor are any sociological alternatives considered. There is, however, a credible
sociological alternative. Let me sketch that alternative, at least in broad outline.
If it is even approximately correct, then the ambitions of Fear of Knowledge simply
could not be met.
Letmedogmatically registermybelief that a lot of relativist conviction is animated
by the thought that the authority of reason, and its attendant rhetoric of objectivity,
is a mask for the interests of power. That the authority of reason is a mask for
the interests of power has a number of recent sources. Nietzsche's doctrine that
the value of truth is a generalization of the Christian virtue of truthfulness and so
the expression of ressentiment is one, Marx's doctrines about class interests and their
cultural expression is another. A deeper source is, perhaps, the historical experience
of European colonialism. Whatever its source, it is a widely held fear aecting a
variety of people of a variety of dierent political persuasions. Thus the New York
Times is simultaneously deemed to be rightwing, leftwing, and Zionist propaganda
depending, of course, on whom you ask. When in the grips of the hermeneutics of
suspicion, relativism can seem to be an eective means of resistance. This is the
role that relativism plays in postcolonial thought. Consider some of the darker
passages from Said's book, Orientalism.
Suppose, then, that relativism is a reaction to the thought that the authority of
reason, and the attendant rhetoric of objectivity, is a mask for the interests of power.
How might such a relativist react to Fear of Knowledge? Even if Boghossian's argu
ments succeeded perfectly on their own terms, the ambitions of Fear of Knowledge
could not be met. A relativist motivated by the thought that the authority of reason
is a mask for the interests of power will not be moved by the case put forward in
Fear of KnowledgeFear of Knowledge simply does not address that fear. Even if Fear
of Knowledge did indeed address this relativist's arguments, since these arguments
aren't the source of relativistic conviction but their expression, demonstrating their
failure would fail to persuade. Indeed, in the grips of the hermeneutics of suspicion,
rational counterargument could only seem like power's illicit attempt to resist its
subversion by relativistic countermeasures.
Reason is not utterly impotent in this regardhowever, the case would take a very
dierent form than Boghossian's. It would involve, rst, the frank admission that all
belief is subject to contingent historical explanation but would patiently explain that
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absolute epistemic justication is not thereby undermined. It would involve, as well,
the frank admission that the rhetoric of objectivity is sometimes abusedthat it is
indeed sometimes a mask for the interests of power, but would insist that, where
it is, relativistic countermeasures are unnecessary and that reason has sucient
resources to eectively criticize this misappropriation of its authority. This would
involve portraying power's exploitation, for its own ends, of the authority of reason
as inimical to reason's proper domain. Such exploitation would be, as Kant puts
it, a kind of `misology, that is, hatred of reason' (4:395). Any eective case against
contemporary relativism must deal sympathetically with the fear that motivates it.
A failure to deal sympathetically with that fear runs the risk of exacerbating it and
further entrenching relativistic conviction.
References
Paul Boghossian. Fear of Knowledge, Against Relativism and Constructivism. Clarendon
Press, Oxford, Oxford, 2006. 1, 4, 5
Hartry Field. Realism, Mathematics Modality. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989. 8
Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thompson.MoralRelativism andMoralObjectivity.
Blackwell, Cambridge, 1996. 10
John McFarlane. Relativism and disagreement. Philosophical Studies, forthcoming.
10
13
